The social relations model (SRM; Kenny, 1994 
Thesocialrelationsmodel(SRM)isastatisticalmodeldeveloped
by David Kenny and his associates (1994; Kenny & La Voie, 1984; Warner, Kenny, & Stoto, 1979) to study interpersonal perception and behavior. A small but growing number of empirical studies have used the SRM to examine interpersonal perception and relations in psychotherapy groups (e.g., Marcus, Hamlin, & Lyons, 2001; Marcus & Holahan, 1994) and graduate student training groups (e.g., Chen & Mallinckrodt, 2002; Wright & Ingraham, 1985) . Although I have previously discussed the ways in which the SRM may be used to study therapy groups (Marcus, 1998; Marcus & Kashy, 1995) , the present article is not about research methodology. Instead, the aim of this article is to describe how an SRM perspective may be used by group therapists to observe and conceptualize interpersonal feedback in groups.
The basic premise of the SRM is that interpersonal perception may be partitioned into four basic components, namely constant, perceiver, target, and relationship, plus an error component. For example, if John dislikes George who is a member of his therapy group, each of these components may contribute to his dislike. John and George may be members of a very combative and hostile group in which the group members generally dislike one another. In SRM terms, the constant reflects this group effect. Alternatively, the group as a whole may not be especially hostile, but John may dislike many people (perceiver effect). It may also be the case that most people dislike George (target effect). High levels of target variance are indicative of consensus (Kenny, 1994) among the group members. It may even be that John likes most people and most people like George, but for some unique reason (e.g., George reminds John of the bully who persecuted him throughout high school) John can't stand George (relationship effect). Finally, John's dislike of George may be fleeting and random-for example, George had requested feedback from the group at a time when John was having a particularly bad day (error).
With the SRM, Kenny developed a mathematical model that allows researchers to partition the variance in interpersonal judgments. In order to perform this variance partitioning, it is necessary to have multiple perceivers rate multiple targets. Such data have most typically been collected using a round-robin design in which each participant rates and is rated by every other group member. Because group members both attend to one another and serve as the focus of others' attention (and also serve as both the senders and recipients of feedback), I have suggested that therapy groups are naturally occurring round-robins and that the SRM is an ideal tool for group psychotherapy research (Marcus, 1998; Marcus & Kashy, 1995) . Kenny designed the SRM with a nomothetic orientation (Kenny & Albright, 1987) and as a mathematical model it is not directly applicable to individual cases. For example, using the SRM, Marcus et al. (2001) found that members of substance abuse treatment groups tended to be more rejecting of members who were higher in negative affect. Although this finding may help alert group therapists to the risk that their dysphoric clients could be scapegoated, it would not be possible to perform a formal social relations analysis to determine whether a particular depressed member is being rejected by the group. However, despite the fact that the SRM, as a mathematical model, cannot be applied to individual cases, an SRM orientation may still provide a helpful guide to group therapists when conceptualizing interpersonal feedback among members.
INTERPERSONAL FEEDBACK
In his seminal review, Kivlighan (1985) noted that the receiver and deliverer of interpersonal feedback represented two interrelated dimensions that were often conflated by theorists, clinicians, and researchers. Different factors may influence whether group members are willing to provide or accept feedback and the acts of giving or receiving feedback may have different impacts. In a similar vein, Cohen (2000) has recently contrasted cybernetic and intersubjective models of feedback in group psychotherapy. According to Cohen, when feedback is conceptualized from a cybernetic perspective, the focus is on what the feedback reveals about the recipient. The intersubjective model "places the focus, instead, on what donors are saying about themselves" (p. 171). By noting that the therapist and group can focus on either the receiver or deliverer of feedback and by emphasizing the potential value of drawing attention to the deliverer, Cohen's distinction has considerable heuristic value. However, Cohen drew this distinction in the context of advocating for the superiority of the intersubjective model, asserting that the cybernetic model "is consistent with narcissistic beliefs in the power of others' perceptions to control one's being" (p. 163) and that it is "implicitly coercive" (p. 171). In contrast the SRM does not make a priori assumptions about the source or value of any particular interpersonal perception or act. There may be times in which the feedback reveals more about the perceiver, and other times when it is more relevant to the target. Furthermore in some instances the feedback might be most pertinent to the unique relationship between the perceiver and the target, and at times it might even be most usefully examined for what it reveals about the group as a whole. The SRM can provide group therapists with a framework for thinking systematically about feedback.
Consider an example from an early session of a therapy group at a university counseling center. Jim and Sue were discussing how their fathers had bad tempers and would often scream at them, when Ann asked Sue if she ever tried just laughing it off. Following Cohen, a group therapist taking an intersubjective orientation could focus on what Ann's suggestion tells us about her. This approach might very likely have yielded a fruitful exploration. However, from an SRM perspective, the therapist would not automatically focus on Ann, but would instead consider each component that could contribute to this instance of feedback (see Table 1 ). At the level of the constant or group, has a norm developed that members should avoid talking about painful or unpleasant aspects of their histories? The group was new, so few clearly identified norms had developed, but as a new group, it was likely that the members were uncomfortable discussing painful topics. If there is evidence for this component, such as other instances where members encouraged one another to minimize and avoid distress, then the focus might most productively be placed on what this instance of feedback says about the entire group. One way to assess the contribution of the constant would be for the therapist to consider whether Ann would have given this feedback to Sue if they were members of a different group or if this group had been at a different stage of development.
At the individual level, the perceiver and target contributions could be considered. There were other instances in which Ann displayed or verbalized discomfort with conflict and with discussing traumatic events. For example, later in the same session following a mild disagreement among three group members, Ann said "I don't know, but this arguing has got to go or I can't do this." Such instances suggest that one component of this feedback could be attributed to the perceiver and they support Cohen's approach to exploring feedback. To consider the degree of perceiver variance, the therapist might consider whether (a) Ann would have given similar feedback to others and (b) whether others would have given this feedback to Sue. If the answers to these questions are generally yes and no, respectively, these answers suggest that perceiver variance is quite high.
Additionally from an SRM perspective, it is also important to consider that others (both in and out of the group) often did not take Sue seriously and that she frequently received feedback that indicated that others did not perceive when she was genuinely in pain. For example, after Sue explained that she had missed a prior session because of "back pain due to stress" no one in the group asked about how she was feeling. When the therapist brought this to the group's attention, two other members (not Ann) explained that they had gotten the impression from Sue that her pain was "no big deal." Furthermore, during the not infrequent occasions when Sue cried in group, the members did not express the same degree of concern toward Sue that they did toward other members when they cried. These instances suggest that target variance also contributed to Ann's feedback to Sue. To consider the degree of target variance, the therapist might consider whether others (a) would have also given Sue the feedback that Ann had given and (b) whether Ann would have given this feedback to another member. If the answers to these questions are yes and no, respectively, this pattern suggests high levels of target variance.
Even if the group members agree with the feedback given to a recipient, it does not mean that this feedback is necessarily accurate (Levesque & Kenny, 1993) . In the familiar case of the scapegoat, there may be considerable consensus among group members in their negative evaluations; however these judgments are often distorted and inaccurate (Cohen & Schermer, 2002) . Al-though there is little reason to think that therapists' perceptions are entirely veridical, because of their unique roles as participant-observers in the group (Yalom, 1995) , therapists bear the responsibility for intervening when feedback that is consensually validated by the group appears to be inaccurate (or even accurate but one-sided).
Although most approaches to feedback distinguish between the perceiver and the target, the SRM posits a further distinction between generalized and unique contributions to feedback. The discussion of perceiver and target effects mentioned above dealt with individual-level or generalized effects: the extent to which Ann might give this feedback to any member of the group (perceiver) and the extent to which any member of the group might give this feedback to Sue (target). However, there is also the degree to which Ann would not typically give such feedback to other group members and others would not have given such feedback to Sue. This aspect of feedback, unique to the dyad of Ann and Sue in this example, is identified as the relationship effect in the SRM. Evidence of a relationship effect in this example was that Ann did not direct her advice to Jim, although he was part of the discussion, and no one else in the group joined in and recommended that laughing off abuse was a good way to handle the situation. The degree to which idiosyncratic feedback (i.e., feedback that other members of the group are unlikely to give) derives from the perceiver or the relationship can guide how it is processed in group. If the feedback appears to be primarily a function of the perceiver (i.e., she would have said it to almost anyone in the group), then the focus could be on Ann and a consideration of what it was in general that such discussions elicit in Ann might be most helpful. However, if the feedback were particular to this relationship (i.e., she would have only said it to Sue), then the focus might be most productively placed on what was unique about Ann's reaction to Sue. Furthermore, this unique response raises the question of reciprocity.
One potential source of confusion in the SRM terminology is that it is possible to have a relationship effect without mutuality.
Although confusing, this distinction can have important implications. Just because Ann's feedback is unique to Sue (relationship effect) does not mean that Sue reciprocates it. Ann may have given Sue this feedback because Sue reminded her of a friend or sibling who exaggerated her problems and took herself too seriously, even if Sue never behaved in this way toward Ann and never minimized Ann's problems. In other words, despite the relationship effect-the uniqueness of Ann's feedback to Sue-Sue may have been an innocent bystander. Alternatively, Ann's feedback to Sue may have been part of a reciprocal pattern in which each minimized the seriousness of the other's concerns. In SRM terms, there is dyadic reciprocity when Ann's relationship effect with Sue correlates with Sue's relationship effect with Ann. If there is reciprocity, considerable productive work may be accomplished by focusing on Sue and Ann's relationship. What has each member done with, to, or for the other to lead to a pattern of mutually discounting the other's distress? However, if Ann's unique feedback to Sue is not reciprocated, then it would be misleading to concentrate on Sue's contribution, except in the sense that Sue is "standing in" for some significant other(s) in Ann's life.
The SRM makes a further distinction that may serve as a heuristic for group therapists: This is the distinction between generalized and dyadic reciprocity (Kenny & Nasby, 1980) . Whereas dyadic reciprocity is defined as the correlation between relationship effects, generalized reciprocity is the correlation between perceiver and target effects. Put concretely, if Ann minimizes Sue's problems (more than she minimizes other group members' problems and more than other group members minimize Sue's problems) and Sue does the same to Ann, this would be an example of dyadic reciprocity. In contrast, generalized reciprocity would be if Ann tends to minimize most of the group members' problems and in return the group members disregard her troubles. Once again making this distinction may guide a therapist's interventions.
This SRM distinction between relationship effects and dyadic reciprocity parallels the psychodynamic distinction between pro-jection and projective identification. As Rutan and Stone (2001) have noted, "projection is a one-person system in which the other person is an unknowing and unwilling party to the projections" (p. 235), whereas "projective identification refers to a two-party phenomenon that involves both projection and an acceptance of the projected traits" (p. 234). However, unlike the concepts of projection and projective identification, which are simultaneously descriptive and explanatory, the terms relationship effects, dyadic reciprocity, and generalized reciprocity are purely descriptive. Therapists with both psychodynamic and other theoretical orientations might also make use of these concepts. Thus, the SRM may provide an especially useful perspective for theorists who are working toward psychotherapy integration (e.g., Gold, 1996) . For example, interpersonal theories (e.g., Kiesler, 1996) that posit complementary patterns in interpersonal relations (e.g., hostility begets hostility, dominance elicits submission) are describing generalized reciprocity. Alternatively, intersubjectivity (e.g., Ogden, 1994; Safran & Muran, 2000) , because it involves both uniqueness and mutuality, is more closely related to dyadic reciprocity than it is to perceiver or target effects (Marcus & Buffington-Vollum, 2005) .
When researchers perform a social relations analysis, the individual-level variance components (i.e., perceiver and target effects) can be correlated with self-report data. The correlation between self-report and perceiver effects assesses assumed similarity and the correlation between self-report and target effects assesses self-other agreement (Kenny, 1994) . Each of these concepts may also prove useful for group therapists. When there are high levels of assumed similarity, group members are providing feedback based on the assumption that the targets of the feedback are just like them. Ann may have suggested that Sue should laugh off her father's bad temper because Ann presumed that her situation is the same as Sue's-perhaps Ann had learned that it was too dangerous to confront her own father (or, alternatively, Ann's father may have been "all bark and no bite" and could be safely laughed at). If the group therapist had reason to believe that assumed similarity contributed to Ann's feedback to Sue, it may have been beneficial to help Ann focus on identifying differences between her situation and Sue's.
We (Mahaffey & Marcus, 2006) recently found assumed similarity for psychopathy-related traits (e.g., Coldheartedness, Machiavellianism) among members of outpatient sex offender treatment groups. Specifically, group members who reported higher levels of psychopathy traits also rated the other members of the group as high on these traits. More generally, SRM studies have found robust assumed similarity correlations for the big five personality traits, with especially high correlations for Agreeableness (Kenny, 1994) . Given the strong evidence of assumed similarity for a variety of traits and characteristics, it may often be worthwhile for group therapists to consider this possibility whenever a group member gives feedback. Universality is a therapeutic factor, especially during the early stages of group development (e.g., Yalom, 1995) . However, as the group matures there are also times during which challenging the assumption of similarity/universality and helping clients learn to differentiate themselves from the other group members are therapeutic.
High levels of self-other agreement indicate that the client agrees with the feedback. However, it is worth noting that even self-other agreement does not ensure the accuracy of the feedback. Thus, Sue may have agreed with Ann's advice and not have taken her own situation all that seriously, even if her distress was legitimate. Cohen and Schermer (2002) have noted that some group scapegoats may respond "agonistically" and accept the group's condemnation. Thus, even when group members agree with the feedback that they receive, this self-other agreement may stem from other factors besides the accuracy of the feedback (e.g., a desire to avoid conflict, shared distorted assumptions about the recipient of the feedback, the client's acceptance of the role to which the group has assigned him or her).
Admittedly, adopting an SRM perspective requires mastering a new terminology. Most group therapists do not typically use terms like generalized and dyadic reciprocity and even more commonly used terms like "relationship" have an idiosyncratic meaning within the SRM. However, the precision and rigor of the model may capture more of the complexity of group process than other models. Furthermore, although portions of the SRM terminology overlap with other group therapy models, the SRM is not simply a translation of an existing language but encourages distinctions that may be obscured by other terminologies. For example, although group therapists unfamiliar with the SRM might equate relationship effects with transference, there is no direct correspondence between the terms. Transference may arise from the perceiver, the relationship, the target, the group (constant), or a combination of any of these components. For example, if Eric assumes that all group leaders are powerful and dangerous and must be treated in an obsequious manner, then his transference reaction is largely due to the perceiver because all group leaders are the same to Eric and the personal characteristics of individual leaders do not really matter. Alternatively, Eric might not cower around most group leaders, but the leader of the group to which he was assigned might bear an uncanny physical resemblance to his cruel and unpredictable uncle Olaf. In this instance, the relationship would be the source of Eric's transference reaction, even if the group leader's behavior and intentions were nothing like Olaf's. Furthermore, just as there can be objective countertransference (Winnicott, 1949) , presumably there can also be objective transference in which group members accurately react to some facet of the group leader's personality or leadership style. In these instances, the source of the transference reaction would be attributed to the target. Finally, as Yalom (1995) has noted, the same group leader may be perceived and treated in entirely different ways by different groups. For example, one group may be deferential and perceive the leader to be wise and omniscient, whereas another group may see this same leader as incompetent and foolish. In these instances the transference reaction may be primarily attributed to the unique ecology and history of the group (i.e., the constant component).
Similarly, although perceiver and target effects are individual-level effects, the SRM does not necessarily equate them with stable personality traits. In fact, the relationships among perceiver and target effects and various personality traits represents an empirical question that may be investigated using the SRM. For example, Marcus and Holahan (1994) found a large significant correlation of .60 between the personality trait of assertiveness and target effects for perceptions of dominance among group therapy clients: Assertive group members were seen as dominant. However, even in this instance much of the target variance for dominance could not be accounted for simply by the personality trait of assertiveness (36% shared variance). By explicitly distinguishing between static personality traits on the one hand, and individual-level perceiver and target effects (that typically arise from the combination/interaction of the person and the situation), the SRM is actually quite consistent with the core assumptions of interpersonally oriented group therapists (e.g., Yalom, 1995) . How a group member is perceived by the other members of the group (target effect) is not purely a product of that member's personality traits, nor is the stereotypical manner in which a perceiver views others (perceiver effect) simply a function of that perceiver's personality.
PROCESS COMMENTARY AND THE SRM
If, as Yalom (1995) has noted, "process focus is the power cell of the group" (p. 137), then one benefit of this SRM approach is that it draws the therapist's attention to group process. The SRM approach is content neutral. Thinking about group feedback in such terms as perceiver, target, and dyadic reciprocity involves a shift from what is being discussed to how the members' relate to others and to the relationships in the room. For example, if the therapist notices that much of the feedback in a group involves large proportions of perceiver variance, this would suggest that the members are not relating to each other as individuals, but instead tend to see everyone in the group as alike. The therapist could then consider a variety of hypotheses: Have the members not begun to differentiate among one another because the group is new? Are the members not paying attention to one another when they speak? Are the members of this group so characterlogically disturbed that they are incapable of making distinctions?
The SRM may provide a means for integrating process with content. Specifically, the therapist can consider how process does or does not change depending on the content that is being discussed. Are there certain topics that generate consensus (i.e., high levels of target variance)? Is the level of reciprocity related to the affective tone in the room? Much SRM research (e.g., Kenny, 1994) has involved comparing the composition of interpersonal perceptions of different personality traits. For example, in situations where perceivers are asked to rate the personalities of strangers, there is considerably more target variance for judgments of extraversion than for judgments of agreeableness (Kenny, Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994) . Analogously, in a group in which scapegoating is common, the therapist might observe that there is more consensus when negative feedback is given than when positive feedback is given (e.g., the group members all agree when Howard tells Dick that he is insensitive but if someone notes that Don has been working hard to be more compassionate or if Karen is praised on her insights few other group members concur).
Many of the questions that could help a group leader determine which SRM components contributed to an instance of feedback could also be asked of the group as a way to help the members gain a more complex and complete understanding of their interpersonal relations. In the example of Ann and Sue, the leader might have asked the group if anyone else would have given Sue this feedback. Note that this question focuses on group process unlike the content-focused question of whether anyone agreed with Ann. Sue could have been asked if she had previously received similar feedback from others. The group leader could also have asked Ann whether she would have given similar feedback to anyone else in the group. Depending on the answers to these questions the group could then focus on the target effect (e.g., "What does Sue do that leads other members to be dismissive of her pain?"), the perceiver effect (e.g., "Ann, what are you feeling when members of the group talk about their abusive parents?"), or the relationship between Ann and Sue (e.g., "Ann, what do you see in Sue [that other members of the group do not and that you do not see in other group members] that leads you to give her this feedback?"). Furthermore, if there is evidence for a perceiver effect, the issue of generalized reciprocity could be explored by asking the group to reflect on what impact Ann's feedback has on them and how they typically react to such feedback. This feedback about her own feedback may help Ann determine if these are the reactions she wishes to elicit. Alternatively if dyadic reciprocity is suspected, the group may be asked to comment on Ann and Sue's relationship (e.g., "Has anyone noticed a pattern in the way Ann and Sue behave toward one another?"). In this instance Ann and Sue could explore what each contributes to the pattern in order to maintain it. They could then consider whether they want to continue this pattern or try relating to one another in a different way.
The value of the SRM is that it may provide a more systematic method for addressing interpersonal feedback. For instance, after considering Ann and Sue's history and behavior in the group, the therapist might estimate that the constant accounted for little of the variance (perhaps about 10%) in this feedback, the perceiver and the target made more substantial contributions (about 35% each), and the relationship contributed a smaller but not negligible amount of variance (maybe around 20%). Based on these estimates, the therapist could decide that the most fruitful focus would be either on Ann's general pattern of minimizing others' problems or Sue's superficial style that leads others to minimize her distress. Of course, such estimates are only rough guesses and even group therapists who are unfamiliar with the SRM frequently make similar decisions in their groups. However, by thinking in terms of the SRM, the therapist has a framework for considering each of the possible components of the feedback. Brown (2003) recently noted that despite the plethora of definitions for group process, none explicitly distinguish between the micro-and macro-level process. The SRM actually encompasses three levels of analysis. The constant is at the group or macro level.
At the micro level are both the perceiver and target, which are individual-level effects, and the relationship effect at the dyadic level. Thus using the SRM to think about group process encourages therapists to consider the multiple levels of analysis.
CONCLUSION
The proposed SRM approach to thinking about interpersonal feedback is not intended to serve as a school of group psychotherapy. Unlike, for example, interpersonal (e.g., Yalom, 1995) , psychodynamic (e.g., Rutan & Stone, 2001 ), or systems-centered (e.g., Agazarian, 1992) approaches, it involves no presuppositions about human nature and personality, the manner in which therapeutic change is accomplished, or the goals of therapy. Instead this SRM approach can serve as a scaffolding for organizing and integrating concepts both within and across theoretical orientations. We (Marcus & Buffington-Vollum, 2005) recently demonstrated how the SRM could be used to organize much of the countertransference literature, especially noting how the concept of "subjective countertransference" (Winnicott, 1949) incorporates both perceiver and relationship effects. Similarly, the Sullivanian notion of parataxic distortion as used in Yalom's interpersonal approach can be decomposed into both perceiver and relationship components. Thus, this SRM approach does not tell group leaders what to think about group process and interpersonal feedback, but it may serve as a useful tool for how to think about these issues. Finally, it is worth noting that whereas standard statistical models that require independence (i.e., noninfluence) among participants may have contributed to the schism between psychotherapy researchers and practitioners, because the SRM models the interdependency among group members, this approach may help to bridge the gap between research and practice.
